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THE CRAB FISHERMAN AND HIS 
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COMPASS FOR THE NON-
OFFENDING PARENT IN CHILD 
PROTECTION CASES 
ANGELA GREENE* 
Parents have a constitutional right to raise their children without 
interference from the state.  It is also well settled that the state may 
step into a family and take custody of a child if it finds that a 
child’s welfare is in danger.  Although an offending parent found 
to be unfit by a court ruling could have his or her child taken 
away, states differ as to what safeguards should be afforded to 
non-offending parents in child custody cases.  This Article argues 
that Alaska, which has unsettled law in this area, should adopt 
rules that protect the rights of non-offending parents with minimal 
interference from the state.  In order to help determine what rules 
are appropriate, this Article describes different approaches states 
have taken with regard to custody and non-offending parents and 
it advocates for laws that protect the interests of non-offending 
parents. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  THE CRAB FISHERMAN AT SEA 
There is no issue more important to the courts than the 
mandate to protect children from abusive or neglectful parents.  
Yet, the need to balance that compelling interest against the 
fundamental rights of parents is a constitutionally confused area of 
the law.  It gets even more complicated when a fit, non-offending 
parent presents himself to authorities and claims he is ready to care 
for the child, even though the other parent may have neglected or 
abused the child.  At this point, the judge, lawyers, and children’s 
services workers are left in a constitutional quandary:  does the 
court have any authority to intervene when a fit parent is present?  
If so, when does that authority begin and end? 
For example,1 suppose you spend much of the winter working 
on the crew of a crab-fishing boat.  You sail on the Bering Sea out 
of Dutch Harbor, Alaska as part of the reality show The Deadliest 
 
 1. The following facts are a composite of actual cases and issues arising in 
daily practice regarding child protection law in Western Alaska. 
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Catch.2  Although you are gone for months at a time, your wages 
from this work support your family living in Anchorage for the 
whole year.  Before you left your home in Anchorage, your wife 
and two children were fine, although your marriage was a bit rocky 
due to your extended absences.  However, to your knowledge, your 
wife is a good mother to your children while you are gone. 
Three months into your work on the Bering Sea, you receive 
word from a social worker via satellite phone that your wife has 
been arrested for driving while intoxicated with the children in the 
car, and she was coming from her abusive boyfriend’s house.  She 
had a black eye and was too intoxicated to give the names of 
relatives or friends who were able to take the children, so the social 
worker placed the children in an emergency shelter in Anchorage. 
The social worker also notifies you that your children are now 
in state custody, because the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) 
filed a petition in state court to have them declared in need of aid.3  
The temporary custody hearing authorizing the placement 
occurred without your participation, because weather and 
communication problems inherent in the region made it impossible 
to contact you in time for the hearing.4 
You protest, claiming that you are perfectly capable of caring 
for the children because your mother can take them until you get 
off the boat.  The social worker does move the children to their 
grandmother’s house after this conversation, but OCS retains state 
custody5 and continues to pursue a formal adjudication against you 
and your family, in part because you cannot physically care for the 
children yourself as you are still on the crab-fishing boat. 
Incensed, you interrupt your season and pay your way from 
the Bering Sea to Anchorage to retrieve your children from the 
state, assuming that once you explain the situation to the social 
worker yourself, this will be over and the state will leave your 
family alone.  You soon discover it is not that simple. 
 
 2. The Deadliest Catch is broadcast on the Discovery Channel and 
documents the daily lives of crab fishermen on the Bering Sea. 
 3. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 6–7; see also 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.011(8)–(10) (2006). 
 4. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 10. 
 5. Custody in Alaska means: 
[T]he responsibility of physical care and control of the child, the 
determination of where and with whom the child shall live, the right and 
duty to protect, nurture, train, and discipline the child, the duty of 
providing the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, and 
the right and responsibility to make decisions of financial significance 
concerning the child. 
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.084(a) (2006). 
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After a week of travel, you arrive at the Anchorage OCS, 
identification in hand, and request your children back.  The social 
workers refuse to give them to you, citing the temporary custody 
order issued by the court, and instead allow you only supervised 
visits at the OCS office.  The social worker says she first has to do a 
background check before she can let you see your kids without 
supervision, although she cannot tell you how long that will take. 
Two days later you have a court date, where you are formally 
advised of the petition and appointed a lawyer.6  You explain to the 
judge that you can care for your children and want them back 
home with you, naively assuming that he will understand your 
position, release the children to you, and allow you to get on with 
your life.  Instead, the court continues custody, leaving visitation at 
the discretion of OCS, and sets the adjudication date for four 
months in the future.7  Meanwhile, during those four months, you 
will be expected to participate in a case plan with OCS designed to 
reunite your family.8  You are stunned and begin to wonder how 
the court can do this since you are the father, can care for the 
children, and did not do anything to neglect or otherwise endanger 
them. 
In the language of child protection, the issues in this scenario 
revolve around the constitutional rights of the non-offending 
parent.  The legal question is whether a court can adjudicate these 
children as in need of aid when a fit, non-offending parent is willing 
and able to care for them, notwithstanding the acts of the offending 
parent.9  If adjudication is not permissible, then what steps can the 
state take to administer its compelling interest in the safety of the 
children put at risk by one parent, while still balancing the other 
parent’s constitutional rights? 
To make sense of this scenario and to answer these questions, 
this Article will first give an overview of the relevant United States 
Supreme Court case law governing the right to parent in order to 
argue the unconstitutionality of adjudicating a child as in need of 
aid when a fit and willing parent is present.  The Article will then 
 
 6. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 10. 
 7. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (2006) (requiring that an adjudication 
hearing be completed within 120 days). 
 8. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 13. 
 9. Alaska uses the term “child in need of aid” to describe a child brought 
under the court’s supervision due to neglect or abuse.  Other states use variations 
on this terminology to describe neglected or abused children coming before the 
court.  In this Article, “child-in-need-of-aid,” “dependent,” and “neglected” are 
terms used interchangeably to mean children who find themselves before the 
court through their parents’ actions. 
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survey the different state approaches to this problem, with special 
comparison to Alaska law. Finally, it will present a model solution 
for our crab fisherman that protects the child and the constitutional 
rights of the fit parent.  This Article seeks to provide a logical 
conceptual framework for practitioners, judges, and state 
legislators when addressing the issue of non-offending parents in 
child protection proceedings. 
II.  A REVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  
CASE LAW:  RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN CHILD PROTECTION CASES 
It is settled law that parents have a fundamental right to 
parent their children without interference by the state.  This 
fundamental right is protected by the liberty interest inherent in 
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and by the Ninth Amendment’s grant of residual 
liberties to the people.10  As a matter of constitutional law, the 
government may not restrict fundamental rights unless it 
demonstrates a compelling interest.11  In the relationship between 
parent and child, the state’s compelling interest exists if the parent 
is unfit to make decisions regarding his or her own children.12  
Without a showing that a parent is unfit, the state normally has no 
justification to interfere with the family unit.13 
Unfitness cannot be presumed by the parent’s circumstances; 
the state must make an individualized assessment of the parent’s 
ability to care for his children.14  Thus, the fact that one parent is 
unfit does not alter the state’s burden to prove the other parent is 
also unable to care for the child before it may interfere in the 
 
 10. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (holding that parents 
have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of their 
children and that courts should give deference to parents’ decisions); id. at 91–92 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the right of parents to direct the upbringing of 
their children is a fundamental right protected by the Ninth Amendment); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(noting that the traditional relation of the family is a fundamental right protected 
by the Ninth Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) 
(holding that marriage and procreation are fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 11. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). 
 12. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–58 (1972). 
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family.15  The United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
when both parents are available for their children, the state must 
prove that each parent is unfit before it may take custody of the 
children or otherwise interfere with the family.16 According to the 
Stanley Court, the individualized assessment of each parent is 
necessary to prevent the arbitrary and unjustified interference with 
a parent’s important fundamental right.17  To rule otherwise would 
lead to a situation where one parent’s actions negate the 
constitutional rights of the other. 
States protect this fundamental right by specifically defining 
parental unfitness in state child neglect and dependency laws.  
These unfitness definitions are not standardized.  However, each 
has in common the goal of using the state’s parens patriae18 power 
to protect the child while maintaining, when possible, the family 
unit.19  No matter the particulars of the various state laws, once the 
parents have been found to have committed an act or failed to take 
an action, as defined under state law, that risks or leads to harm to 
their children, the parents are also found constitutionally unfit to 
exercise the fundamental right to care for and have custody of their 
children.20  At this point, the state’s compelling interest in the 
welfare of children overrides the parents’ rights, and the state is 
authorized to exercise its parens patriae power by taking action to 
protect the child.21 
 
 15. See id. at 652 (“What is the state interest in separating children from 
fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a 
particular case?”). 
 16. Recognizing that each parent has this fundamental right does not impede 
the state’s ability to act when one parent is unknown and the known parent’s 
actions put the child at risk.  “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”  Parham v. J.R., 442 
U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) 
(emphasis added)).  In the case of a missing or unknown parent, due process 
would require a state to make every reasonable effort to contact that parent.  
Diligent efforts to contact or identify the missing parent would be sufficient to 
meet the demands of due process.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 
(1976). 
 17. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656–57. 
 18. “‘Parens patriae,’ literally ‘parent of the country,’ refers traditionally to 
[the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal 
disability.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652. 
 21. See id. 
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Without a finding of unfitness, the state has no constitutional 
authority to exercise that power.22  Furthermore, each parent is 
entitled to the same rights.23  In other words, under current 
Supreme Court authority, the existence of a single fit parent, 
regardless of the acts of the other parent, negates the state’s ability 
to interfere in the family unit.24 
Adjudication of a child as dependent or neglected, even when 
a fit parent is present and able to care for the child, 
unconstitutionally trumps the fit parent’s fundamental right to 
parent his or her child without state interference.  With a fit parent 
present, the state lacks any compelling interest sufficient to justify 
state involvement in the family.  Thus, adjudication of a child as 
dependent or neglected, without a finding of unfitness on the part 
of both parents, is unconstitutional because it permits the court to 
interfere with the family unit without the requisite compelling 
interest. 
III.  DEFINING THE NON-OFFENDING PARENT:  
OVERVIEW OF ALASKA LAW AS COMPARED TO OTHER STATES 
Alaska has not directly addressed the question of the effect of 
the availability of a non-offending parent on adjudication, although 
it has acknowledged the lack of clarity of the law in this area.25  The 
use of misguided dicta in a previous Alaska case, Jeff A.C. v. State,26 
has muddied the waters in this area because the Jeff A.C. court 
stated that adjudication can be had “based on the acts of just one 
parent.”27  This statement created unnecessary confusion regarding 
the substantive due process rights of non-offending parents, 
because the father in Jeff A.C. raised a procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, due process claim.28  The father argued only that he 
had a procedural due process right to an adjudication hearing prior 
to termination of parental rights, not that he was a fit parent to his 
child.29  The Jeff A.C. case did not involve a fit parent who was 
willing and able to care for his child and who had timely asserted 
his fundamental right to parent without interference by the state.  
In other words, he was not a true non-offending parent.  One 
 
 22. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000). 
 23. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651–52. 
 24. Id. at 652. 
 25. See Peter A. v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 
146 P.3d 991, 996–97 n.30 (Alaska 2006). 
 26. 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005). 
 27. Id. at 703. 
 28. Id. at 702. 
 29. Id. at 702–03. 
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reason the father in Jeff A.C. was not a non-offending parent was 
because he had unsuccessfully participated in a case plan with the 
OCS and faced termination of his parental rights due to his failure 
to assume responsibility for his child.30 
In contrast to the procedural claim in the Jeff A.C. case, the 
Alaska Supreme Court’s treatment of the substantive issue in Peter 
A. illustrates the difference in judicial consideration of the two 
types of due process claims.  The Peter A. case presented the court 
with a fit, non-offending parent pressing a timely, substantive 
constitutional claim.31  Instead of relying on the Jeff A.C. case, the 
Alaska Supreme Court avoided the substantive constitutional 
question altogether by finding the matter moot after the child was 
released to the father at disposition.32  Nonetheless, the Alaska 
Supreme Court did vacate the adjudication on equitable grounds.33  
The Court also acknowledged the gap in Alaska law regarding the 
constitutional necessity of an adjudication hearing for both parents 
if both of the parents are known.34 
Alaska’s avoidance of the question of substantive 
constitutional rights contrasts with decisions from other states 
directly addressing such rights of the fit, non-offending parent.  
Nationwide, in deciding cases where there was a true non-
offending parent, four states have found that the presence of a fit 
parent negates the state’s ability to interfere with the family.35  
Other states limit the court’s ability to interfere at the adjudication 
stage with legislation designed to set boundaries on state power, 
thereby avoiding the need to address the rights of non-offending 
parents solely through case law. 36 
 
 30. Id. at 704–05. 
 31. Peter A. v. Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 
146 P.3d 991, 993 (Alaska 2006). 
 32. Id. at 994. 
 33. Id. at 997. 
 34. Id. at 996–97 n.30. 
 35. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); In re 
Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985); In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 
850 (Pa. 2000); Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118, 121 (W. Va. 1975). 
 36. Peter A., 146 P.3d at n.30; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4035(2)(C) 
(2005) (requiring court to make “a jeopardy determination with regard to each 
parent who has been properly served”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
819(e) (2006) (“If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one 
parent of the child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to 
care for the child, the court may not find that the child is in need of assistance, but, 
before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent.”); In 
re Okla. Unif. Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 131 (Okla. 2005) 
(discussing necessary evidence for adjudication of deprivation of a child and 
02__GREENE.DOC 12/17/2007  11:29:36 AM 
2007] NON-OFFENDING PARENTS’ RIGHTS 181 
A few states take a different approach, drawing the 
constitutional line at custody.  These states permit an adjudication 
of the child as in need of assistance even when a presumptively fit 
parent is present.  However, a fit parent is entitled to physical and 
legal custody of his or her child absent a showing of unfitness, the 
acts of the other parent notwithstanding.37 
Finally, Ohio stands alone among the states in drawing no 
constitutional line at all.  Ohio permits the adjudication and 
disposition of a child into state custody even when a fit, non-
offending parent is present.38 
Each of these approaches will be addressed in detail in Part IV 
and Part V of this Article, with Part V offering a model solution for 
Alaska based on a constitutional analysis of these approaches to a 
non-offending parent’s rights. 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS STATE APPROACHES TO THE  
NON-OFFENDING PARENT AND A COMPARISON TO ALASKA LAW 
As stated above, the lack of clarity in Alaska law on the issue 
of the non-offending parent is the result of dicta in a procedural 
due process case that did not involve a true non-offending parent.  
A non-offending parent, like our crab fisherman, would press both 
a substantive and a procedural due process claim at the trial court 
level in order to try to get his children released to him 
immediately.39  As a fit parent, he would not wait around for a 
termination proceeding, like the father in Jeff A.C. v. State40 did, 
before asserting only a procedural due process right to a hearing he 
 
stating that a child is not deprived “if the other parent was providing satisfactory 
care for the child”). 
 37. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2 (West 2006); In re Austin P., 13 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 616, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); B.C. v. Dept. of Children and Families, 864 
So.2d 486, 490–91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the Florida statute 
allows adjudication based on acts of one parent, but remanding to allow father to 
make a record on an as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute); In re 
Stephanie H., 639 N.W.2d 668, 680–81 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002). 
 38. In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (Ohio 2006). 
 39. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120–22 (1989).  The 
Michael H. court rejected a father’s separate procedural and substantive due 
process claims to his biological child born during the marriage of the mother to 
another man.  The father’s procedural claim rested on California’s failure to 
provide him a forum to assert his substantive claim.  The substantive claim 
asserted that the mother’s marriage was an insufficiently compelling interest to 
interfere with his constitutionally protected rights as a father—a separate claim 
from the lack of a procedural mechanism to enforce the asserted substantive right. 
 40. 117 P.3d 697, 699 (Alaska 2005). 
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should have asked for upon first contact with the state.  However, 
Alaska is not alone in contributing to the confusion about the 
substantive fundamental rights of parents—Michigan made the 
same error in another procedural due process case. 
To illustrate the distinction between the procedural and 
substantive claims and to point out the deficiency in Alaska law, 
this Part will begin with an analysis of analytically parallel Alaska 
and Michigan decisions that used regrettably broad language to 
address procedural claims raised by parents who were clearly not 
fit.  Then, the discussion will focus on Alaska’s reaction to an 
appeal raised by a true non-offending parent who was fit, yet saw 
his children adjudicated as in need of aid.  In this comparison, the 
contrast between the procedural and substantive claims becomes 
clear, and the gap between Alaska law and other states’ more 
comprehensive laws stands in stark relief. 
Next, this Part of the Article will concentrate on the 
approaches taken by those other states in confronting substantive 
constitutional claims raised in non-offending parent cases.  While 
the details of the laws vary greatly across the states, and the case 
law interpreting these provisions is often driven by unpleasant 
facts, there are two dominant approaches explicitly addressing the 
substantive rights of non-offending parents in child protection 
cases.  For non-offending parents, states either do not permit 
adjudication if a fit parent is present and able to care for the child 
or do permit adjudication but draw the constitutional line at the 
custody determination. 
A. The Theory that Trial Court Jurisdiction Attaches to the Child:  
Misguided Dicta from Alaska and Michigan that Does Not 
Apply to True Non-Offending Parent Cases. 
Alaska and Michigan courts have both decided strikingly 
similar cases that are seen as permitting adjudication based on the 
actions of only one parent.  However, given the facts and 
procedural posture of those cases, it is overreaching to conclude 
that they stand for the proposition that an adjudication of a child as 
dependant or neglected can constitutionally occur when a fit parent 
is available.  These cases did not involve a non-offending parent 
asserting fundamental rights; instead, they were procedural cases 
with parents unable to remedy the conditions that led to the 
children being placed in state custody.  Thus, the parents faced 
termination of their parental rights. 
The Alaska Supreme Court considered a procedural due 
process argument that a father’s rights to his children could not be 
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terminated without a prior adjudication specifically as to him.41  In 
Jeff A.C., the state placed the children in state custody due to the 
mother’s substance abuse.42  The mother then incorrectly identified 
the father to the social worker.43 Thus, the state initially pursued 
reunification efforts with the wrong person.44  After approximately 
one year, the OCS identified Jeff as the father and located him in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.45  Following an initial period of 
resistance, Jeff participated in a case plan for a year and during that 
time never asserted his right to force the state to prove him unfit in 
an adjudication hearing.46  Jeff’s efforts ultimately proved 
unsuccessful, and the state filed a petition to terminate his parental 
rights.47  After the state filed the termination petition, and just prior 
to trial, the father moved to bifurcate the proceedings and asserted 
his right to a separate adjudication hearing before termination.48  
The trial court denied that motion, and, after a contested 
proceeding, terminated the father’s parental rights.49 
On appeal, the father claimed the lack of a prior adjudication 
was error and asserted that procedural due process entitled him to 
an adjudication before his parental rights could be terminated.50  
The Alaska Supreme Court held that a prior adjudication was not 
required, particularly when the father’s conduct was sufficient to 
justify termination of his parental rights.51  However, rather than 
focusing solely on the procedural aspects of the case in rejecting 
the claim, in dicta the court mistakenly linked the jurisdiction of 
the trial court to that of the child’s status. The court stated that the 
“ultimate focus of a [child-in-need-of-aid] adjudication is on the 
child, not the parents.”52  The court then stated that a child can be 
adjudicated based on the acts of one parent and that the “other 
parent’s acquiescence or fault in allowing the abuse to occur is not 
required in order to find the child to be in need of aid.”53  With this 
broad language, the Alaska court incorrectly conflated the 
 
 41. Id. at 700–04. 
 42. Id. at 700. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 700–02. 
 46. Id. at 701. 
 47. Id. at 702. 
 48. Id. at 702–03. 
 49. Id. at 703. 
 50. Id. at 702. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (citing A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Alaska 1989)). 
02__GREENE.DOC 12/17/2007  11:29:36 AM 
184 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [24:173 
substantive and procedural due process aspects of child protection 
cases.  As demonstrated in Part II of this Article, the matter of the 
constitutional necessity of a hearing and adjudication on both 
parents, if known, was settled by the United States Supreme Court 
in Stanley v. Illinois.54 
Aside from the constitutional concerns in the wording of the 
Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Jeff A.C., the “child-centered” 
language is an inaccurate summary of the purpose and scope of the 
Alaska statutes.55  Alaska specifically defines the acts or omissions 
by the parents upon the child which render the parent legally unfit 
to raise the child.56  Indeed, any other interpretation of Alaska 
statute section 47.10.011 would render the statute 
unconstitutional.57 
In a similar case where a parent asserted a procedural due 
process claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals made the same error 
as the Alaska Supreme Court.  In Michigan, the court of appeals 
held that a termination order could be entered against both 
parents, even when the trial court had not held a prior adjudication 
as to the father.58  While procedurally this may be correct for a 
number of reasons, the Michigan court also included unfortunate 
dicta that based the jurisdiction of the court over a family solely on 
the child’s condition, not the acts of the parents. 
In In re C.R., the state child protective agency filed a petition 
alleging that the substance abuse and extensive criminal histories of 
both parents caused the children to come within the jurisdiction of 
the Michigan courts.59  Subsequently, the parties reached an 
agreement whereby the mother would plead no contest to the 
allegations in the petition, the petition against the father would be 
 
 54. 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972). 
 55. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (2006). 
 56. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(1) (parent abandons child); § 47.10.011(2) 
(parent incarcerated and other parent absent); § 47.10.011(3) (parent’s 
whereabouts unknown and custodian unable to provide care); § 47.10.011(4) 
(parent knowingly fails to provide medical treatment); § 47.10.011(6) (parent fails 
to adequately supervise child); § 47.10.011(7) (sexual abuse from parent or by 
failure of parent to adequately supervise child); § 47.10.011(8) (parent creates 
conditions terrifying child or exposes child to violence); § 47.10.011(9) (parent 
neglects child); § 47.10.011(10) (parent’s ability to parent impaired by alcohol); § 
47.10.011(11) (parent mentally ill); § 47.10.011(12) (parent approves of or 
encourages illegal behavior by child).  An exception is Alaska Statute section 
47.10.011(5), which allows a runaway child to be deemed a CINA. 
 57. See supra Part II. 
 58. In re C.R., 646 N.W.2d 506, 515–16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
 59. Id. at 508. 
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dismissed, and both parties would participate in family support 
services recommended by the state.60 
Despite agreeing to participate in the services offered, the 
parents continued to drink, neglected their children, and the father 
went as far as to shave all the hair off his body to avoid complying 
with the court’s order for drug testing.61  After approximately 
eighteen months of unsuccessful reunification efforts, the state filed 
a termination petition against both parents.62  The trial court found 
that both parents suffered from alcohol and drug addictions that 
impaired their ability to parent their children and that termination 
was in the children’s best interests.63  The father and mother both 
appealed the order.64 
On appeal, the father argued that because the original petition 
against him had been dismissed, and no subsequent adjudication 
entered, the appellate court must reverse the trial court’s 
termination order because his right to procedural due process of 
law was violated.65  The Michigan court disagreed, finding that, 
under Michigan law, once the trial court found jurisdiction over the 
children due to the mother’s no-contest agreement, the court had 
the right to compel the other parent to adhere to a case plan or 
take other steps necessary to reunify with their children.66  In 
deciding this issue, the Michigan court held that the state rules did 
not require the child protection agency to allege and prove child 
dependency against every parent involved.67  Instead, the Michigan 
court found jurisdiction tied to the status of the children, thus 
permitting the court to terminate parental rights of a parent who 
has not been an official party to the prior proceedings.68 
This decision has been cited for the proposition that a court 
can interfere with the family unit even when a fit parent is available 
to care for the child.69  This case stands for nothing of the sort.  
 
 60. Id. at 508–09. 
 61. Id. at 509–10. 
 62. Id. at 510. 
 63. Id. at 511. 
 64. Id.  The mother’s appellate arguments involved the sufficiency of the 
evidence against her and are not relevant to the issues addressed in this Article. 
 65. Id. at 511. 
 66. Id. at 514–16. 
 67. Id. at 515. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Vivek Sankaran, But I Didn’t Do Anything Wrong: Revisiting the 
Rights of Non-Offending Parents in Child Protection Proceedings, 82 MICH. BAR. 
J. 22 (2006) (criticizing as unconstitutional Michigan’s statutory scheme that he 
interprets as allowing adjudication based on acts of one parent). 
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Because this father was not a non-offending parent, the decision 
does not stand for the proposition that single parent adjudication is 
constitutionally permissible if one parent is fit.70 
The father in C.R. was clearly not fit and had submitted to the 
court’s jurisdiction for at least a year prior to the termination trial.71  
During the entirety of the proceedings involving his family, he did 
not claim a right to adjudication or the right to make the state 
prove him unfit before it interfered with his family.72  Further, the 
appellate court’s holding was grounded in procedural, not 
substantive, due process.73  Nowhere in the C.R. decision does the 
court decide whether a fit parent may be deprived of the right to 
the unfettered care and custody of his children without a finding of 
unfitness, nor did it have reason to do so, as the father was 
obviously unfit. 
In addition, the Michigan court’s statement that jurisdiction of 
the court is dependent on the status of the child is, like Alaska’s, 
incorrect as a matter of state law.  Michigan Statute section 
712A.2(b) defines what it means to be an unfit parent in Michigan.  
This law speaks only to acts or omissions of the parents or guardian 
that leave a child a ward of the court.74  Like its Alaska counterpart, 
 
 70. Contra id.  In his article, Professor Sankaren reads C.R. too broadly and 
applies it to a non-offending parent situation but does not argue that the decision 
is easily distinguishable on the grounds that C.R. was a procedural due process 
case, not one involving a true non-offending parent asserting his or her 
substantive, fundamental rights before the court.  See id. 
 71. See In re C.R., 646 N.W.2d at 508–11. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 518–19. 
 74. Michigan Statute section 712A.2(b) states in large part: 
Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years of age found 
within the county: 
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and 
maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to 
provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or 
other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a 
substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is 
abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is 
without proper custody or guardianship. . . . 
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, 
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, 
nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to 
live in. 
(3) Whose parent has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply 
with a limited guardianship placement plan described in section 5205 of 
the estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.5205, 
regarding the juvenile. 
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it is parental conduct that determines whether a Michigan child is 
dependent or neglected, not merely the condition of the child.  
Thus, the Michigan appellate court’s conclusion that jurisdiction in 
child protection cases is based on the children is incorrect; it is the 
parents’ acts that determine whether they are unfit caretakers for 
their children.  These distinctions render the Michigan court’s 
language regarding jurisdiction being vested in the children nothing 
more than misguided dicta. 
Both Alaska and Michigan use their child protection statutes 
to provide the individualized assessment of parental unfitness 
necessary before the state may interfere with the parent’s 
fundamental right to raise their children.75  The parents’ actions 
must be found lacking to instigate state parens patriae jurisdiction 
over the child.76  Thus, neither the Alaska nor the Michigan 
decision can be used to justify a conclusion that a court could 
constitutionally adjudicate a child as in need of aid when a non-
offending, fit parent is available to care for the child, even if the 
other parent was found unfit. 
Indeed, when presented with just that issue, the Alaska 
Supreme Court did not apply its child-centered language from Jeff 
A.C., but instead punted.  In Peter A. v. Department of Health & 
Social Services,77 the father appealed an adjudication order entered 
solely on the basis of his wife’s substance abuse problems and the 
 
(4) Whose parent has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply 
with a court-structured plan described in section 5207 or 5209 of the 
estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.5207 and 
700.5209, regarding the juvenile. (5) If the juvenile has a guardian under 
the estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.1101 
to 700.8102, and the juvenile’s parent meets both of the following 
criteria: 
(A) The parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting 
the juvenile, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide 
regular and substantial support for the juvenile for 2 years or more 
before the filing of the petition or, if a support order has been 
entered, has failed to substantially comply with the order for 2 years 
or more before the filing of the petition. 
(B) The parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate 
with the juvenile, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, 
without good cause, to do so for 2 years or more before the filing of 
the petition. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(b) (2007) (finding jurisdiction where, for example, 
parents fail to provide necessary medical and educational care, create an unfit 
environment, or violate other relevant statutes). 
 75. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972). 
 76. Id. at 658. 
 77. 146 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2006). 
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risk it posed to their children.78  He had been hospitalized for more 
than a year for serious and permanent injuries sustained in a 
snowmachine accident when the OCS placed his children in state 
custody.79  OCS did so because the mother arrived intoxicated at 
the hospital facility to visit with the father late one night, bringing 
two of her children with her.80 
The state filed an emergency petition based solely on the 
mother’s conduct.81  The father appealed the adjudication, claiming 
he was a fit parent and thus entitled to raise his children without 
further state interference.82  However, the trial court found the 
children in need of aid under Alaska law.83  The trial court did not 
make a finding against the father; instead, the adjudication of child-
in-need-of-aid status was based entirely on the actions of the 
mother.84 
At the disposition hearing, one month after adjudication, the 
state moved to dismiss the case and release the children from 
supervision because they had been safe at home with the father for 
four months.85  The father agreed to the dismissal, but appealed the 
adjudication which found that his children were in need of aid on 
the grounds that the state did not find him unfit to care for them.86  
Because the children had a fit parent with full custodial rights, 
ready, willing and able to care for them, the father argued that the 
state lacked any compelling interest sufficient to justify the court’s 
jurisdiction over his children prior to the dismissal of the case.87 
Peter A. was a true non-offending parent who timely asserted 
his right to parent his children.  Faced with this situation, the 
Alaska Supreme Court did not apply the Jeff A.C. case to its 
analysis, or its child-centered language.  Instead, the court 
acknowledged the lack of precision in Alaska law and noted that 
Alaska’s statute did not specifically address the rights of both 
parents.88  As to the father’s constitutional arguments, the court 
 
 78. Id. at 992. 
 79. Id. at 992–93. 
 80. Id. at 993. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 996, n.30. 
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found the matter moot as the children had been returned to him, 
but, as a matter of equity, vacated the adjudication order.89 
As the Peter A. case demonstrates, the unfortunate dicta in the 
prior Alaska and Michigan opinions, implying that it is solely the 
condition of the child that confers jurisdiction on courts in child 
protective proceedings, only confuses what should be a rather 
straightforward issue.  Can the state prove the child has no fit 
parent available to care for him or her?  If no fit parent exists, then 
the state has the compelling interest to act as parens patriae.  If a fit 
parent is available to care for the child, then the state lacks the 
compelling interest to interfere and must return the child to that 
parent.  Putting the emphasis on the child’s status permits the state 
to skip the constitutionally required unfitness finding for each 
parent and unnecessarily complicates what should be a relatively 
simple matter. 
B. The Simple and Constitutional System:  A State Does Not 
Have the Power to Interfere with the Family When a Fit 
Parent is Available to Care for the Child 
Unlike Alaska and Michigan, three other states—New York, 
Maryland and Pennsylvania—have each directly addressed the 
issue of the fit, non-offending parent through case law and found 
that a child cannot be deemed dependent or neglected if a fit 
parent is available to care for that child.90  Alaska should adopt the 
reasoning of these states, either through legislation or case law, 
because requiring proof of unfitness against both parents at 
adjudication has the virtue of being both simple and constitutional, 
and it can be done in a manner that protects children. 
New York has consistently held that a child cannot be 
adjudged dependent if a fit parent is available to care for her.91  In 
 
 89. Id. at 994–96. 
 90. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); In re M.L., 
757 A.2d 849 (Pa. 2000); see also In re Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1985); In re Okla. Unif. Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 131 
(Okla. 2005) (discussing necessary evidence for adjudication of deprivation of a 
child and stating that a child is not deprived “if the other parent was providing 
satisfactory care for the child.”); Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118, 122 (W. Va. 
1975) (finding that non-offending parent may not be deprived of custody of his 
children). 
 91. See Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 477; see also Alfredo S. v. Nassau County 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 568 N.Y.S.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“If the 
department believed the petitioner to be an unfit father, it was obligated to make 
a sufficient showing in this proceeding of extraordinary circumstances, or to 
commence a neglect proceeding against him.”). 
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In re Cheryl K., the mother was not a party to the original child 
abuse hearing that found that the minor’s father had sexually 
abused her. 92  The trial judge placed the child in state custody.  A 
year later the mother moved to vacate the placement of the child in 
foster care.93  The New York court framed the substantive issue as 
follows:  “Where the court has adjudicated only one parent of 
abuse or neglect, does the non-offending parent, not a party to the 
proceedings, have, absent a finding of neglect or unfitness, a right 
to custody of her children superior to that of third parties, 
including the Commissioner of Social Services?”94 
The New York court determined that the mother did have that 
superior right against all third parties and that the right was based 
on her fundamental right to the care and custody of her child.95  
Without a finding of unfitness against the parent, the court has no 
authority to intervene in family affairs.  The court also noted that 
the Commissioner had a remedy if he were concerned about the 
welfare of the child in the mother’s custody, since he was free to 
file a petition alleging that the mother was unfit to care for her 
child.96  The court stayed its own order for seventy-two hours to 
allow the social welfare department time to decide whether to file a 
petition.  If the state did not file, then the child would be returned 
to her mother.97 
Maryland addressed the issue of the non-offending parent 
through statute rather than constitutional interpretation.  In In re 
Russell G., the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the 
Maryland Child-In-Need-of-Assistance statute required 
adjudication against both parents before a child could be deemed 
neglected.98  The court stated that this decision was consistent with 
the purposes of the child-in-need-of-assistance statute in that:  “A 
child who has at least one parent willing and able to provide the 
child with proper care and attention should not be taken from both 
parents and be made a ward of the court.”99 
 
 92. Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 477. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 477–78; see also In re Alfredo S., 568 N.Y.S.2d at 127 (“If the 
Department believed the petitioner to be an unfit father, it was obligated to make 
a sufficient showing in this proceeding of extraordinary circumstances, or to 
commence a neglect proceeding against him.”). 
 97. In re Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 478. 
 98. 672 A.2d 109, 114 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). 
 99. Id. 
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Although the court did not render its holding as a matter of 
constitutional law, it reached the constitutionally correct result.  
While this was the right result as a matter of law, the holding 
nonetheless presented practical problems for family court judges.  
In some cases, the non-offending parent did not have legal custody 
of the child because the offending parent received custody in a 
prior divorce proceeding.  Literal application of the law would 
leave family court judges compelled to return a child to an abusive 
parent because the non-offending parent, while fit, would not have 
legal custody.100 
In response to this problem, the Maryland legislature devised 
a unique solution.  It revised its child-in-need-of-assistance statute 
to allow a modification of custody upon a finding that the 
allegations in the petition are true.  Specifically, Maryland Code 
section 3-819(e) states: 
If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one 
parent of a child, and there is another parent available who is 
able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that 
the child is a child in need of assistance, but, before dismissing 
the case, the court may award custody to the other parent.101 
The finding that the allegations are sustained against one parent is 
a jurisdictional precondition to the modification of custody.102  The 
Maryland approach has the advantage of simultaneously protecting 
the child from the offending parent, protecting the rights of the fit 
parent, and preserving the family, all of which are consistent with 
the goals of family laws throughout the country.  While Maryland 
approached this as a statutory issue in Sophie S., the unfitness 
finding is constitutionally required before a court has jurisdiction to 
deprive a parent of custody.103 
Pennsylvania addressed the practical need to transfer custody 
from the abusive, unfit, parent to the fit parent through case law 
rather than legislative action.  In In re Jeffrey S.,104 the father faced 
an accusation of sexual abuse.105  The mother and father of the 
children were married at the time of the abuse.106  The mother 
 
 100. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125, 1130 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) 
(paraphrasing counsel for Department of Social Services recitation of history of 
Maryland Code section 3-819(e)). 
 101. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e) (2007). 
 102. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d at 1133. 
 103. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972). 
 104. 628 A.2d 439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 105. Id. at 440. 
 106. Id. 
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found out about the abuse, informed the authorities, and petitioned 
under state law to have the father removed from the home.107 
Subsequently, the mother requested that the father be 
permitted to return to the home, and made arrangements for her 
children to stay with the grandmother.108  The state filed a 
dependency petition, heard in court on the same day the father 
entered a guilty plea to some of the criminal allegations.109  The 
trial court sustained a finding of dependency based on the theory 
that the mother had minimized the abuse and wavered in her 
support of her husband.110  The court of appeals reversed.111  Noting 
that the purpose of child dependency proceedings is to preserve 
families, the court stated that a child cannot be adjudged 
dependent “where an innocent, caring, and loving parent is ready, 
willing, and able to provide the child with proper parental care and 
control.”112 
The Jeffrey S. court rightly concluded that the existence of a fit 
parent negated the right of the state to insert itself into the family.  
Because the parents were married, however, the opinion did not 
address the impact of a prior custody order on the court’s ability to 
protect the child from an offending parent.  Following this ruling, 
Pennsylvania family courts thus faced the same problem Maryland 
courts had; when a prior custody order granted custody to the 
offending parent, judges were put in the position of returning a 
child to an abusive parent, even where the non-custodial parent 
was fit. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court solved this problem with its 
holding in In re M.L.,113 a case involving unfounded allegations of 
sexual abuse of a child made by the child’s mother against the 
father.114  The trial court adjudicated the child dependent even 
though the father was available to care for the child.115  In reversing, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held: 
When a court adjudges a child dependent, that court then 
possesses the authority to place the child in the custody of a 
relative or a public or private agency.  Where a non-custodial 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 441. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 757 A.2d 849 (Pa. 2000). 
 114. Id. at 850. 
 115. Id.  Although the trial court adjudicated the child as dependent, it did 
award custody to the father.  Id. 
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parent is available and willing to provide care to the child, such 
power in the hands of the court is an unwarranted intrusion into 
the family.  Only where a child is truly lacking a parent, guardian 
or legal custodian who can provide adequate care should we 
allow our courts to exercise such authority.116 
To solve the problem of prior civil custody orders, the court stated 
that trial courts in dependency cases have the inherent authority to 
modify child custody orders, based on the statutory mandate to act 
in the best interests of the children.117  This authority exists with or 
without a dependency finding.118 
While this approach seems to offer greater flexibility to judges 
in changing custody orders in the best interests of the children, it is 
constitutionally questionable.  Unlike in Maryland, no official 
finding of unfitness on the part of either parent is explicitly 
required before a Pennsylvania court can change custody.119  
Unfitness is the indispensable constitutional trigger to judicial 
intrusion in the family unit.120  Despite this constitutional flaw, 
Pennsylvania’s solution does give it the power needed to protect 
both the child and the non-offending parent.  The constitutional 
concern is easily addressed by requiring a trial court judge to make 
a finding that the offending parent is unfit before custody is 
modified. 
These states provide valuable guidance to Alaska in tackling 
the gap in Alaska law regarding the non-offending parent.  To fix 
this problem, Alaska should adopt the first principle of parental 
rights enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. 
Illinois,121 and duly followed by New York, Maryland and 
Pennsylvania through their case law and legislation—a child is not 
in need of aid if he has a fit parent available and willing to care for 
him.  As seen by the examples of these three states, recognition of 
this first principle would not put an onerous burden on the state, 
nor would it endanger the children in the state’s care.122  It would 
 
 116. Id. at 851. 
 117. Id. at 851 n.3. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 851. 
 120. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 56, 68–69 (2000). 
 121. 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972). 
 122. See also In re Okla. Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 
119, 131 (Okla. 2005) (discussing necessary evidence for adjudication of 
deprivation of a child and stating that a child is not deprived “if the other parent 
was providing satisfactory care for the child”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
4035(2)(C) (2006)  (requiring court to make “a jeopardy determination with 
regard to each parent who has been properly served”).  Oklahoma and Maine 
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mean only that children would return more quickly to their families 
and the state would save resources for truly needy children. 
C. The Constitutionally Dubious Compromise:  States Allowing 
Adjudication Based on the Acts of One Parent, but Drawing 
the Constitutional Line at Custody 
The second general approach among states to non-offending 
parents is that adjudication can be based on the acts of one parent, 
but states temper that constitutional imposition with a presumptive 
right of custody for the non-offending parent with the burden on 
the state to show unfitness prior to denying custody.123  However, 
even that compromise position is increasingly being challenged as 
unconstitutional.124  In those states allowing adjudication based on 
the acts of one parent, no cases have directly challenged the 
constitutionality of the statutes when one fit parent is present and 
able to arrange satisfactory care for his children.  On these facts, 
those statutes would be ripe for a constitutional challenge.125  
Alaska should not embrace this approach as it is constitutionally 
dubious, intellectually incoherent, and does nothing more to 
protect children than adhering to the first principles of parental 
rights. 
California’s scheme is an example of this intellectual 
incoherence.  California deals with the question of non-offending 
parents by permitting the adjudication of a child as dependent 
based on the actions of one parent and then presumptively entitling 
the non-offending parent to custody at disposition.  However, while 
the California appellate courts have stated that adjudication can 
occur in the absence of a finding of unfitness of both parents, the 
question of whether “the non-offending parent can protect the 
child from the offending one is relevant to a determination of 
 
save state resources and protect families from unwarranted intrusion through 
these legal mechanisms. 
 123. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.521 (2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2 
(2007); In re Austin P., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); B.C. v. 
Dep’t of Children and Families, 864 So. 2d 486, 490–91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); 
In re Stephanie H., 639 N.W.2d 668, 679 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002). 
 124. See B.C., 864 So. 2d at 491 (holding that Florida statutory law allows 
adjudication based on acts of one parent, but remanding to allow father to make a 
record on an as-applied constitutional challenge); see also Sankaran, supra note 
69, at 22 (criticizing as unconstitutional Michigan’s holding in In re C.R., 646 
N.W.2d 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), which he interprets as allowing adjudication 
based on the acts of one parent). 
 125. See Sankaran, supra note 69, at 24; see also discussion supra Part II. 
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whether the petition should be dismissed altogether.”126  In Aaron 
S., the California Appellate Court went on to say that it is 
“appropriate to sustain a petition on the basis of one parent’s 
conduct if the other parent will not be able to protect the child.”127 
This approach to adjudication needlessly muddies the 
distinctions between fit and unfit parents.  A parent who is 
unwilling to protect his child from serious harm is—or should be 
deemed—unfit; therefore, the state could file a petition alleging 
unfitness and have adjudication against both parents.  As it is, the 
constitutionally required finding of unfitness is relegated to an 
evidentiary matter under California law.  The simple act of filing a 
petition naming both parents (if known) would avert the 
constitutional problems inherent in California’s adjudication 
system. 
While California’s method of adjudication is constitutionally 
suspect, California does protect the rights of a fit parent to the 
custody of his or her children at disposition.  Once a child is 
deemed dependent, a non-offending parent is entitled to file a 
petition requesting custody of the child.128  The parent is 
presumptively entitled to custody absent a showing of detriment to 
the child.129  In other words, before the court may interfere in the 
familial relationship by seeking custody and/or removal of the child 
from the home, California requires a showing that the 
presumptively non-offending parent is unfit. 
The presumptive right of custody for the non-offending parent 
is consistent with those states allowing adjudication based on the 
acts of one parent.130  While the non-offending parent retains 
custody of the child, adjudication can still take place.  In Florida, 
for example, a child can be deemed dependent even when a fit 
 
 126. In re Aaron S., 228 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 127. Id. 
 128. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 361.2. 
 129. In re Austin P., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 130. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 361.2 (applies to a previously non-custodial 
parent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-307 (2007) (applies to a previously non-
custodial parent).  A California court has held that the constitutional rights of an 
incarcerated father who could delegate care of his children while incarcerated 
prevented the state from usurping custody absent a showing of physical harm to 
the child from the father’s planned arrangement.  See In re Isayah C., 13 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 198, 209–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).  Likewise, in Nebraska, the courts permit the 
adjudication of a child in need of assistance with a non-offending parent present, 
but require proof of unfitness before the non-offending parent can be denied 
custody. In re Stephanie H., 639 N.W.2d 668, 679–82 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002). 
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parent is available to care for him.131  This constitutional imposition 
on the fit parent is mitigated by Florida’s mandate requiring “the 
court to place a child with a nonoffending parent who desires to 
assume custody unless there is a showing that the child would be 
endangered by such placement.  Further, the best interest standard 
does not apply.”132  As in California, the Florida courts require a 
showing that the non-offending parent is unfit before denying 
custody. 
This right to custody in Florida applies even when the non-
offending parent has not had any prior contact with his child.  In In 
re K.M.,133 the state filed a dependency petition against the mother, 
claiming that she could not parent her children due to her 
substance abuse and mental illness.134  The state placed the child 
with maternal relatives.135  At the time, the father’s whereabouts 
were unknown and the trial court specifically withheld adjudication 
as to him.136  One month later, the father was identified and found 
to be living in New York.137  He wrote a letter to the court asserting 
his right to raise his child and inquiring as to the steps he needed to 
take to achieve that goal.138  The trial court subsequently found him 
to be a non-offending parent under Florida law and ordered a 
home study to be done in New York pending placement of the 
child with him.139  Meanwhile, the court ordered telephonic 
visitation for the father.140 
After numerous delays in the home study process because of 
concern over living arrangements of the father’s girlfriend, the trial 
court denied the father’s motion for custody of his child and 
granted permanent custody to the maternal grandmother.141  The 
trial court also ordered the grandmother to encourage telephonic 
visits between the father and child, but did not grant him any 
 
 131. B.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 864 So. 2d 486, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (holding that a single parent adjudication is permitted under the 
statute, but remanding to permit an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of 
the statute). 
 132. In re K.M., 946 So. 2d 1214, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 39.521(3)(b) (2007). 
 133. 946 So. 2d at 1214. 
 134. Id. at 1216. 
 135. Id. at 1217. 
 136. Id. at 1216–17. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1217. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1217–18. 
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visitation rights.142  The father appealed, arguing that Florida law 
required custody with the non-offending parent unless “such 
placement would endanger the safety, well-being, or physical, 
mental, or emotional health” of his child.143 
The court of appeals agreed, noting that the father has a 
fundamental liberty interest in the care of his children and that the 
trial court should have considered only whether placement with the 
non-offending parent would endanger the child.144  Since the trial 
court had not made that finding, and the New York home study 
came back without significant concerns, the Florida appellate court 
remanded the case to the trial court for proper review under the 
statute.145  The fact that, according to the opinion, the father had 
not seen his child prior to state involvement, and may have seen his 
child only once in the year of litigation, was not considered by the 
court.146  Because the father was fit, he had the paramount right to 
raise his child, notwithstanding his lack of contact with the child 
prior to state interference.147 
Though the Florida court opinion did not explain why the best 
interest standard did not apply when considering custody for a non-
offending parent, the reason is constitutionally obvious.  As stated 
in Troxel v. Granville, “there is a presumption that fit parents act in 
the best interests of their children.”148  Consequently, so long as a 
parent is fit under Florida law “there will normally be no reason for 
the State to inject itself further into the private realm of the 
family . . . .”149  Thus, even though the father of K.M. had not seen 
his child, he was considered fit; the court therefore had no reason 
to keep custody from him. 
Although these states offer some protection to the non-
offending parent by drawing the constitutional line at the custody 
determination, the practice is still unconstitutional.  Without the 
 
 142. Id. at 1218. 
 143. Id. at 1219 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.521(3)(b) (2007) (“If there is a 
parent with whom the child was not residing at the time the events or conditions 
arose that brought the child within the jurisdiction of the court who desires to 
assume custody of the child, the court shall place the child with that parent upon 
completion of a home study, unless the court finds that such placement would 
endanger the safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the 
child.”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1219–20. 
 146. See id. at 1216–17 n.3. 
 147. The court’s opinion does not disclose the child’s age. 
 148. 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000). 
 149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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initial unfitness pronouncement at adjudication, these states lack 
the constitutionally required compelling interest to make a custody 
determination in the first instance.150  In this situation, the non-
offending parent’s fundamental right to non-interference in the 
parent-child relationship was unjustifiably impaired.  Alaska 
should not adopt this standard when addressing the rights of non-
offending parents. 
D. The Unconstitutional Solution: No Protection at all for the Fit 
Parent 
Among states that have addressed the issue, Ohio stands alone 
in granting no protection to the fit parent.  In a decision that can 
only be described as a national anomaly, the Ohio Supreme Court 
held, in a 4-3 decision, that a fit parent has no superior right to the 
care and custody of his child as against the state.  In In re C.R.,151 
the Ohio Supreme Court held: “[W]hen a juvenile court 
adjudicates a child to be abused, neglected, or dependent, it has no 
duty to make a separate finding at the dispositional hearing that a 
noncustodial parent is unsuitable before awarding legal custody to 
a nonparent.”152 
In this case, the legal issue raised on appeal was the trial 
court’s grant of custody to a non-parent at disposition, even though 
a fit parent was present and wanted to care for his child.153  In states 
like Florida, California and Nebraska, where the state claims the 
power to adjudicate even when a fit parent is present, the father 
would have the presumptive right of custody at the disposition 
hearing absent proof he was unfit.154  However, with this decision 
Ohio has gone further than any other state as the result of the 
court’s failure to draw a constitutional line for state intrusion on 
the parents’ rights. 
As pointed out in the dissent, the majority opinion in C.R. 
does not address the father’s fundamental rights; the entire 
majority opinion is in fact devoid of any mention of his 
constitutional right to the care and custody of his child.155  Given 
the weight of this fundamental right, the majority’s opinion that an 
unfitness finding is not required before an award of custody to a 
non-parent is startling because it ignores direct United States 
 
 150. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). 
 151. 843 N.E.2d 1188 (Ohio 2006). 
 152. Id. at 1192. 
 153. Id. at 1190. 
 154. See supra Part IV.C. 
 155. In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at 1193 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court authority to the contrary.156  No other state has 
gone as far as Ohio in explicitly denying fit parents custody of their 
children.  When clarifying its law on non-offending parents, Alaska 
should not join Ohio in abrogating the constitutional rights of the 
parents. 
V.  SO WHAT ABOUT OUR ALASKA  
CRAB FISHERMAN: HOW TO PROTECT THE CHILD AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PARENTS 
So what would our crab fisherman do with all of this 
information?  As noted in Part II, our crab fisherman has a number 
of rights that can be enforced by the court while simultaneously 
protecting his children from the negligent mother.  As a first 
principle, he has the constitutional right to the care and custody of 
his children, unless Alaska shows that he is unfit. 157  However, even 
with this fundamental right, under current Alaska law he is caught 
in the legal equivalent of a tangled fishing net. 
No Alaska law specifically addresses the rights of fit parents in 
these circumstances, and this father’s fundamental right to parent 
collides with the state’s interest in ensuring the safety of his 
children after they were taken from the custody of an alcoholic, 
neglectful mother.  Under the current state of legal affairs, he is at 
the mercy of the court and OCS; no Alaska rules or statutes guide 
either the courts’ or OCS’s consideration of his conduct and rights, 
as distinct from his wife’s rights.  Nor does any rule spell out the 
balance between his rights and the state’s obligations to children. 
When our crab fisherman finally arrives at OCS in Anchorage 
and demands his children, do his constitutional rights mean OCS 
must give him the children upon nothing more than presentment of 
identification?  No; of course not.  The state should have an 
opportunity to check to make sure the putative father is who he 
says he is, that he is not a registered sex offender, someone with a 
history of violence against the children, or otherwise unfit to 
parent.  This minimal intrusion on his liberty would certainly be 
permissible under the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.158 
The Eldridge test requires a weighing of three factors to 
determine the process due to a litigant before the government:  (1) 
the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of the interest through the procedures used; and (3) the 
 
 156. See supra Part II. 
 157. See supra Part II; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972). 
 158. See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
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significance of the government’s interest.159  Here, the father’s 
private interest in the care and custody of his children is certainly 
of the highest order.  Yet, balanced against the risks to the children 
of an erroneous decision should the father be abusive or a sex 
offender, a background check and few days of visitation hardly 
seems an intrusion sufficient to trump the state’s compelling 
interest in the welfare of children. 
This investigation could be, and should be, done relatively 
quickly.  A model solution would be a court rule in Alaska 
following the guidance by the New York Family Court in In re 
Cheryl K.160  In that case, the New York Family Court held that the 
state had seventy-two hours to file a petition alleging the mother 
unfit if it did not want to turn the child over to the parent.161  
Alaska could fashion a rule allowing OCS seventy-two hours to do 
a background check on the non-offending parent to see if there are 
child protection concerns.  While waiting for the background 
check, a non-offending parent would have liberal visitation.  If no 
protection concerns arise during the visitation and background 
check, the child would be released into the custody of the parent 
and the petition dismissed. 
One of the factors to be considered in this investigation is 
whether the crab fisherman can make arrangements to protect the 
children from the actions of the mother, who had become an 
alcoholic while the father was fishing.  If he could do so, perhaps by 
having extended family assist in the children’s care while he goes 
back to crab fishing, there would be no risk to the children.  If the 
father’s plan consisted of offering the mother a stern scolding but 
continuing to leave the children in her care, the state would be free 
to amend its petition; it could allege that the father is exposing his 
children to a substantial risk of harm by not protecting them from 
his wife.162  The state would then be within its constitutional 
authority to pursue adjudication against both parents. 
Suppose our crab fisherman is committed to protecting his 
children, and asserts that he will leave them in the care of their 
grandmother while he is fishing, thus not putting the children at 
risk.  The state still faces the question of how to assist this father in 
protecting the children from the mother, especially if the father 
were to institute separation proceedings based on her conduct.  
Maryland’s statute provides valuable guidance in this regard.  
 
 159. Id. 
 160. 484 N.Y.S.2d at 476. 
 161. Id. at 477–78. 
 162. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(6) (2006). 
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Alaska could adopt a similar statute permitting an award of 
custody upon a finding that the allegations in the petition are 
true.163 
Under the Maryland scheme, the trial court could not find that 
the crab fisherman’s children were in need of aid because they had 
a fit parent, the father, to care for them, and it could award sole 
custody to him.164  Proceeding in this way minimally infringes upon 
the constitutional rights of the father while protecting the state’s 
compelling interest in the welfare of the children.  Once the court 
issues the custody order, the children would be protected from 
unauthorized contact with the mother.  By dismissing the case, the 
court is not burdened with a continuing and unnecessary child 
protection proceeding that takes resources from addressing the 
concerns of truly needy children. 
Our crab fisherman has some decisions to make regarding his 
family.  With some changes and clarity to Alaska law and minimal 
involvement by social workers, our crab fisherman could make 
those decisions and be back at sea earning a wage to support his 
family within days of taking his children into his custody.165  His 
children could be safe with their grandmother, the father’s mother, 
while he worked.  Hopefully, his wife would find her way to a 
treatment program, but, since the children are safe, the state would 
no longer need to be involved in his family, thereby saving 
resources for more difficult cases. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Most child protection cases are more difficult than that of the 
crab fisherman, but the same constitutional principles always apply.  
For example, one can imagine a soldier being stationed away from 
his child and while he is out of the state and unaware the mother of 
his child gives the child to OCS with the understanding that he or 
she will be adopted.  The father has no notice of the plan as the 
mother has informed OCS that the father is unknown.  The child is 
well cared for in the pre-adoptive placement, and the proposed 
parents love him.  Due to circumstances beyond his control, the 
 
 163. Alaska could also adopt Pennsylvania’s approach, holding that judges in 
children’s matters have the inherent authority to modify custody orders using the 
court’s power to act in the best interests of the children.  See In re M.L., 757 A.2d 
849, 851 n.3 (Pa. 2000).  However, to be constitutional, this would require a 
finding that one parent was unfit. 
 164. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e) (2006). 
 165. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.05.065(2) (“It is the policy of the state to 
strengthen families and to protect children from child abuse and neglect . . . .”). 
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soldier might be gone a year or more before he can get emergency 
leave and come home to get his child, place him or her with family, 
and rejoin his unit.  There are also cases in which the correct father 
is not identified for some period of time, and it is only long into the 
child protection process that the father comes forward claiming 
fitness and a desire to raise his child.  In either of these 
circumstances, the child would be a virtual stranger to the father 
and have already bonded with the foster parents. 
Upon these facts, it would be difficult for a judge to award 
custody against the state and to the father, but the court must 
unless the father is found unfit.  The court must return the child, 
because it is not the business of the courts to decide that “some 
other person might possibly furnish the child a better home or 
better care.”166  The law presumes the child’s best interests are 
served in the care and custody of a fit parent.167  Therefore, if an 
investigation into the father yields no child protection concerns, 
and the parent is fit, the child belongs with the parent even when, 
as in the case of the father in In re K.M.,168 the parent is a virtual 
stranger to the child. 
In these difficult situations, parents, children, social workers, 
lawyers, and judges would be well-served by guidance in the form 
of rules and statutes designed to protect the rights of fit parents, 
while keeping in mind the welfare of the children.  Alaska, and 
other states that have not already done so, should adopt the 
minimally intrusive rules advocated in this Article to provide 
clarity and protection to the non-offending parent.  By following 
this model, families can be reunited sooner and state resources 
reserved for those families needing stronger intervention. 
 
 166. Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118, 121 (W.Va. 1975) (quoting State Dep’t 
of Pub. Assistance v. Pettrey, 92 S.E.2d 917, 921 (W.Va. 1956)). 
 167. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000). 
 168. See 946 So. 2d 1214, 1216 n.3, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
